Is India Quietly Shaping the New World Order?

In the 21st century, international politics resembles a game of high-stakes chess. The board once dominated by the United States as the sole superpower is now crowded with ambitious players: China flexing its economic muscle, Russia reinventing itself as a disruptor, and middle powers like India carving out a role that is neither submissive nor secondary. The old Cold War rules no longer apply.

At the heart of this transformation is India. Long described as the “world’s largest democracy” tilting toward the West, India is now signaling a more complex alignment—maintaining strategic closeness with Russia, pragmatically engaging with China, and at the same time sparring with the U.S. over tariffs and trade disputes. This balancing act has puzzled many observers. Is India betraying the West, or simply hedging its bets?

The answer lies in India’s tradition of strategic autonomy. Far from being indecisive, India’s closeness to Russia and China is a calculated, realistic move. In a multipolar world order, survival and influence belong not to loyal followers but to smart hedgers. India is not “choosing a side”—it is choosing its own side.

To understand today’s India, one must revisit the roots of its foreign policy. After independence in 1947, India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The goal was simple yet profound: avoid becoming a pawn in the Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

In practice, India leaned toward the USSR—not out of ideology alone but necessity. The Soviet Union provided military equipment, nuclear assistance, and, most importantly, unwavering support on the Kashmir issue at the United Nations. By the 1970s, over 70% of India’s defense imports came from Moscow, cementing a partnership that has endured for decades.

After the Cold War ended, India opened up to the United States, especially in the 2000s. The Indo–U.S. civil nuclear deal (2008) symbolized new warmth, as did growing defense and economic cooperation. But India never abandoned its principle of non-alignment; it simply rebranded it as “strategic autonomy.” The present pivot toward Russia and China isn’t a sudden detour—it’s a continuation of this tradition.

The global balance of power is shifting in ways that make India’s hedging even more logical. The era of U.S. unipolar dominance that followed the Cold War is fading. Two major forces are challenging it:

1. China has become the world’s second-largest economy, a leader in technology and manufacturing, and a formidable military power. Its Belt and Road Initiative stretches across Asia, Africa, and Europe, creating new economic dependencies.

2. Russia, though economically weaker, has reasserted itself militarily and diplomatically, from Crimea to Syria to Ukraine.

Meanwhile, regional blocs such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are growing in significance, explicitly challenging Western-led institutions like the IMF and NATO.

India is in a unique position: it sits at the table in Western groupings like the Quad (U.S., Japan, Australia, India) while simultaneously shaping the agenda in BRICS and the SCO. This dual membership is not a contradiction but a strategy. By being everywhere, India maximizes leverage.

While India and the U.S. enjoy growing cooperation in defense and technology, their relationship is far from smooth. Several points of friction show why over-reliance on Washington would be risky:

• Trade disputes: The Trump administration withdrew India’s preferential trade status under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), imposing tariffs on steel, aluminum and other goods. India retaliated.

• Visa policies: H-1B visa restrictions hurt Indian IT professionals, undermining one of India’s strongest export sectors.

• Sanction threats: The U.S. has repeatedly threatened India under the CAATSA law for purchasing Russian defense systems like the S-400.

• Policy differences: From climate negotiations to agricultural subsidies at the WTO, India and the U.S. often clash.

These conflicts highlight an unavoidable reality: the United States is an important but not always dependable partner. Betting everything on Washington would mean tying India’s fate to interests that do not always coincide with its own.

In contrast, India’s relationship with Russia is built on decades of reliability. Despite Western sanctions and criticism, India has consistently maintained defense and energy cooperation with Moscow:

• Defense: Over two-thirds of India’s military hardware is of Russian origin. Advanced systems like the S-400 missile defense shield, acquired despite U.S. opposition, remain critical to India’s security.

• Energy: In the wake of the Ukraine war, India increased oil imports from Russia, securing discounted prices that helped contain inflation at home.

• Technology and space: Russia has collaborated with India in nuclear energy and space programs—areas where the West has historically imposed restrictions.

• Diplomatic backing: Russia has often stood by India in the UN Security Council, particularly on sensitive issues like Kashmir.

This partnership is not about nostalgia for the Cold War. It is about pragmatic realism: Russia provides strategic goods and political cover that no other country offers as reliably.

If Russia represents familiarity, China represents complexity. The India–China relationship is fraught with contradictions.

On one hand, border tensions—including the deadly Galwan clashes in 2020—have heightened mistrust. China’s alliance with Pakistan adds further suspicion. India’s military modernization and Indo-Pacific cooperation with the U.S. and allies are clearly aimed at counterbalancing Beijing.

Yet on the other hand, economic interdependence is undeniable. China remains India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade crossing $135 billion in 2022. India imports critical electronics, pharmaceuticals, and raw materials from China. Moreover, India and China work together in BRICS, the SCO, and on climate issues.

This duality shows India’s strategic maturity. Engagement with China does not mean surrender; it means separating security competition from economic and diplomatic cooperation. By staying engaged, India ensures it remains part of global conversations where China wields influence, rather than isolating itself.

International-relations scholars describe India’s current strategy as hedging—balancing relationships with rival powers to minimize risks and maximize benefits. Instead of aligning with one camp, India keeps multiple doors open.

Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar has articulated this clearly: India does not believe in “joining alliances” but in “multi-alignment.” In his words, “India will not be boxed into a corner. We will make our choices based on our national interest.”

This approach gives India bargaining power. When the U.S. pressures India, New Delhi can point to Moscow and Beijing; when China grows assertive, India can lean into the Quad. By avoiding over-dependence on any one bloc, India protects its autonomy—a luxury smaller states cannot afford.

India’s hedging strategy offers several advantages:

1. Strategic independence: India avoids becoming a junior partner to either the U.S. or China.

2. Economic resilience: Trading with multiple partners insulates India from global shocks.

3. Political leverage: Both the West and non-West need India on their side.

4. Security edge: A diversified defense portfolio combines Russian hardware, Western intelligence and indigenous capabilities.

5. Global role: Being central to both blocs enhances India’s credibility as a leader of the Global South and as a shaper of the multipolar order.

Critics raise four main concerns: isolation from the West, over-reliance on a sanctioned Russia, vulnerability to China, and opportunism. Yet each is overstated. India continues to participate in the Quad and Malabar exercises with the U.S. and Japan; Russia still supplies critical defense systems and cheap oil despite sanctions; India sets clear boundaries with China while maintaining economic ties; and self-interest is the norm in global politics, not the exception. Far from recklessness, India’s approach reflects planned realism.

India’s hedging strategy is visible in concrete decisions. Buying discounted Russian crude despite Western sanctions saved billions of dollars and kept domestic fuel prices stable—a clear case of pragmatism over ideology. Proceeding with the S-400 missile defense deal, even at the risk of U.S. sanctions, underscored India’s determination to secure vital systems and assert autonomy. At the same time, India actively participates in Quad meetings on maritime security while engaging in BRICS summits alongside Russia and China. This dual presence amplifies India’s influence across competing blocs. Taken together, these actions illustrate not indecision but a deliberate, calibrated policy of strategic realism.

Today, India’s foreign policy is less about picking sides than about making informed decisions. By maintaining close relations with Russia, interacting reasonably with China, and continuing to work with the United States and its allies, New Delhi is reaffirming independence rather than ceding it. Although this approach may draw criticism, it demonstrates a calculated and purposeful realism that secures energy, defense, and global influence without becoming overly dependent on any one partner. In a world where power is shifting and allegiances change rapidly, India’s capacity to hedge, positions it as a shaper of the new order rather than a follower. In the end, India is demonstrating that “its own side” may be the smartest side of all.

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